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What	are	the	economic	forces	polarising	the	UK?
Economic	performance	varies	widely	between	different	places	in	the	UK,	writes	Henry	G.	Overman	(LSE).	There	is
a	broad	North-South	pattern,	but	also	substantial	variation	within	those	areas.	In	some	measures,	the	performance
gap	has	widened	since	the	financial	crisis.	Austerity	too	reduced	redistribution	and	so	it	is	partly	responsible	for	the
recent	widening	of	spatial	disparities.	Conseqently,	the	Brexit	vote,	for	example,	was	highly	uneven	with	some
places	more	likely	to	vote	Leave	and	others	more	likely	to	vote	Remain.	Policy,	however,	needs	to
make	sure	that	people	in	disadvantaged	communities	can	access	the
opportunities	generated,	which	will	require	substantial	intervention
across	a	wide	range	of	policy	areas.
Economic	performance	varies	widely	between	the	towns,	cities	and	regions	of	the	UK.	On	some	measures,	this
variation	has	widened	since	the	financial	crisis.	These	disparities	have	already	proved	to	be	a	key	theme	in	the	run-
up	to	the	2019	general	election.		Spatial	disparities	are	important	because	local	social	and	economic	conditions
affect	individual	outcomes.	For	example,	there	are	substantial	differences	in	social	mobility	at	the	local	level:	where
you	grow	up	makes	a	difference	to	how	much	your	family	background	affects	your	life	chances.	Spatial	disparities
also	reflect	individual	inequality.	For	example,	if	individual	inequality	increases	and	poorer	families	are	concentrated
in	particular	areas,	then	spatial	disparities	will	also	increase.
The	link	between	individual	and	spatial	disparities	is	complicated	by	the	fact	that	people	can	move	around.	This
matters	for	thinking	about	what	spatial	disparities	can	tell	us	about	important	policy	issues.	For	example,	the
geography	of	the	Brexit	vote	was	highly	uneven	with	some	places	more	likely	to	vote	Leave	and	others	more	likely
to	vote	Remain.	One	explanation	is	that	the	Leave	vote	reflects	the	‘revenge’	of	‘left-behind’	places	–	that	is,	it	is	a
story	not	about	individuals,	but	about	shared	anger	by	those	living	in	places	left	behind	by	technological	change	and
globalisation.	The	alternative	is	to	think	of	this	as	a	story	about	individuals,	left	behind	by	the	same	forces,	and
where	they	live.
The	first	way	of	thinking	about	this	appears	to	be	driving	the	current	policy	response.	But	the	second	is	perhaps	a
more	useful	way	of	understanding	why	wealthy	Sevenoaks	and	struggling	Sunderland	both	voted	Leave.	Different
kinds	of	people,	with	very	different	concerns	about	the	European	Union,	living	in	different	places	–	but	agreeing	on
the	same	solution.	The	other	reason	why	individual	mobility	matters	is	because	it	means	that	policies	targeted	at
specific	places	don’t	necessarily	end	up	benefiting	the	people	that	we	hoped	to	help.	For	example,	transport
improvements	in	a	poorer	area	don’t	necessarily	end	up	benefiting	poorer	families	if	those	improvements	then	lead
to	higher	rents	and	house	prices	that	see	them	priced	out	of	the	neighbourhood.
Taken	together,	these	two	complications	–	the	need	to	distinguish	between	people	and	place;	and	the	fact	that
people	move	between	places	–	mean	that	it	is	important	for	us	to	understand	what	is	causing	spatial	disparities	and
to	think	carefully	about	who	will	benefit	from	the	different	policies	proposed	to	address	these	disparities.
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Disparities	in	the	UK:	it’s	more	than	just	a	North-South	divide
There	is	a	broad	North-South	pattern	to	spatial	disparities	in	the	UK.	Cities	Outlook	is	the	most	useful	source	of
detailed	data	on	the	economic	performance	of	UK	cities.	The	2019	report	shows	a	very	clear	geography	in	terms	of
both	output	per	worker	and	employment,	with	cities	in	the	Greater	South	East	performing	better.	Eight	of	the	10
cities	with	the	highest	unemployment	(claimant	count)	are	in	the	North	of	England	or	Scotland.	There	is	also
substantial	variation	within	those	broad	areas:	some	northern	cities	(such	as	Manchester)	are	doing	relatively	well
and	some	southern	cities	(such	as	Ipswich)	are	doing	relatively	badly.	Despite	many	policy	initiatives	by	the	current
and	previous	governments,	these	disparities	remain	large	and	persistent.	Indeed,	these	disparities	have	widened
since	the	global	financial	crisis.	Figure	1	shows	a	standard	measure	of	the	extent	of	spatial	disparities	(the
coefficient	of	variation)	calculated	for	the	(NUT2)	regions	of	the	UK	from	1980	to	2015,	the	last	date	for	which	we
have	data.	Disparities	fell	between	1980	and	the	mid-1990s,	increased	in	the	early	days	of	the	Labour	government
before	falling	again.	The	increase	in	disparities	since	the	recession	has	returned	us	to	roughly	the	level	of	the
1980s.
Figure	1:	Spatial	inequality	in	the	UK
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Source:	Author’s	own	calculations	based	on	Eurostat	data	for	NUTS2	regions	of	the	UK
What	are	the	economic	forces	polarising	the	UK?
Better	educated	workers	are	concentrated
According	to	Eurostat’s	latest	figures,	in	2018,	around	65%	of	inner	London	residents	had	tertiary	education,	the
highest	percentage	in	Europe.	This	was	up	from	around	54%	in	2010.	In	contrast,	the	proportion	of	residents	with
tertiary	education	in	Greater	Manchester	was	around	39%	in	2018,	up	from	31%	in	2010.	There	is	also	a	growing
wage	premium	for	graduates	compared	with	people	without	degrees.	Numbers	reported	by	Elliot	Major	and	Machin
(2018)	show	that	in	1980,	male	graduates	earned,	on	average,	46%	more	than	their	non-graduate	counterparts.	In
2017,	this	earnings	uplift	was	66%.	Given	a	strong	and	growing	concentration	of	more	educated	workers	and	a
large	and	increasing	wage	premium	for	graduates,	it	is	not	surprising	that	the	spatial	distribution	of	higher	skilled
workers	explains	up	to	90%	of	area-level	disparities	in	wages	in	the	UK	(Gibbons	et	al,	2013).
Figure	2:	Shares	of	population	with	tertiary	education
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Bigger	cities	make	firms	and	people	more	productive
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There	is	a	great	deal	of	empirical	evidence	of	the	‘agglomeration	economies’	that	underpin	the	relationship	between
a	city’s	size	and	the	productivity	of	its	inhabitants.	Graham	and	Gibbons	(2018)	summarise	results	from	47	studies
estimating	these	agglomeration	economies,	12	of	which	are	from	the	UK.	The	consensus	estimate	suggests	that
once	we	allow	for	the	unequal	spatial	distribution	of	higher-skilled	workers,	the	elasticity	of	productivity	with	respect
to	size	is	around	0.02	to	0.03.	This	means	that	doubling	city	size	increases	people’s	productivity	by	around	2-3%.
While	these	productivity	effects	are	important,	when	it	comes	to	GDP	per	capita,	they	can	easily	be	swamped	by
spatial	disparities	in	the	share	of	skilled	workers.	This	happens	in	the	UK	where	(if	we	exclude	London)	the	overall
relationship	between	city	size	and	GDP	per	capita	isn’t	very	strong	–	as	Figure	3	shows.	Our	cities	still	benefit	from
agglomeration	economies	–	someone	with	a	degree	moving	from	Blackpool	to	Manchester	would	be	more
productive	–	but	this	isn’t	enough	to	encourage	the	sorting	of	highly	skilled	workers	into	some	of	our	bigger	cities
outside	London.
Figure	3:	GDP	per	capita	against	city	size	for	UK	MSA
Underinvestment	in	the	North
Because	London	and	the	South	East	are	rich	and	our	tax	system	is	progressive,	there	is	a	lot	of	redistribution	from
the	South	to	the	North.	But	on	some	measures,	London	receives	a	disproportionate	share	of	investment	in
infrastructure.	A	more	equal	distribution	of	infrastructure	investment	would	slow	growth	in	London.	Whether	it	would
increase	growth	elsewhere	would	depend	on	how	the	money	was	spent	because	the	economic	returns	to
infrastructure	vary	a	lot	across	places.	The	overall	effect	on	regional	inequalities	would	be	limited	since	relative	to
the	concentration	of	skilled	workers,	differences	in	infrastructure	play	a	relatively	small	role	in	driving	long-term
disparities.	The	only	way	for	infrastructure	to	have	a	big	effect	on	spatial	disparities	is	if	it	leads	to	the	relocation	of
large	numbers	of	skilled	workers	across	the	UK,	away	from	London.
The	financial	crisis	and	austerity
London	and	the	South	East	were	initially	hard	hit	by	the	recession,	but	they	have	recovered	more	quickly.
Adjustment	elsewhere	has	been	slower	and,	as	a	result,	spatial	disparities	have	widened.	Local	government	in
England	has	borne	the	biggest	burden	of	austerity	and	cities	in	the	North	of	England	have	been	much	harder	hit
than	those	elsewhere	(Cities	Outlook	2019	provides	more	detail).	Given	that	austerity	reduced	redistribution,	it	is
partly	responsible	for	widening	disparities.[3]	The	resulting	cuts	to	public	services	may	mean	that	austerity	hindered
adjustment	to	the	financial	crisis	and	that	the	adverse	effects	on	disparities	could	persist	in	the	medium	to	long	run.
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Improving	economic	performance	outside	the	capital
Rather	than	focusing	on	London’s	dominance,	we	should	ask	why	other	cities	and	towns	do	not	offer	similar
economic	opportunities	and	what	can	be	done	about	it?	Given	what	we	know	about	the	economic	forces	driving
polarisation,	there	are	two	key	questions:
(1)	In	which	places	could	greater	investment	and	other	government	support	be	used	to	increase	productivity	and
help	create	jobs?
(2)	How	do	we	make	sure	that	people	can	access	these	opportunities?
Evidence	suggests	that	around	50%	of	people	only	ever	work	while	living	in	the	local	labour	market	where	they
were	born	(Bosquet	and	Overman,	2019).	This	suggests	that	the	policy	response	needs	to	be	realistic	about	how
far	people	are	willing	to	move	for	work,	particularly	for	less	educated	workers	(the	figure	rises	to	60%	for	those
without	a	degree).	Having	‘everyone’	move	to	London	and	the	South	East	is	not	economically	feasible,	nor	socially
or	politically	acceptable.	The	same	is	true	for	the	other	extreme:	achieving	a	level	playing	field	where	productivity	is
equalized,	and	jobs	are	generated	‘everywhere’.	We	need	to	be	realistic	about	the	market	forces	at	work.	Equal
outcomes	across	places	requires	places	to	have	similar	skill	composition	and	to	be	of	similar	sizes.	As	with	the
previous	strategy,	this	is	not	economically	feasible,	nor	socially	or	politically	acceptable.
London’s	strong	economic	performance	plays	a	large	part	in	explaining	widening	disparities.	Providing	an	effective
counter-balance	to	London	may	require	some	investment	to	be	more	spatially	focused	–	for	example,	by	identifying
a	number	of	places,	spread	across	the	UK,	that	are	doing	relatively	well	and	focusing	infrastructure	investment	on
achieving	productivity	and	jobs	growth	in	those	areas.
‘Left-behind’	places
An	effective	policy	response	will	require	increased	investment	(LSE	Growth	Commission,	2013)	and	the	reversal	of
austerity.	‘Left-behind’	places	have	high	proportions	of	vulnerable	people	with	complex	needs	and	low	levels	of
economic	activity.	This	compounds	their	problems,	as	long-term	unemployment,	poverty,	mental	illness	and	poor
health	often	go	hand-in-hand.	CEP	research	suggests	that	small	tinkering	and	minor	tweaks	of	existing	policies	will
not	be	enough	to	tackle	the	multiple	barriers	to	social	mobility	faced	in	these	places.	It	is	also	important	to	be	clear
that	spending	in	left-behind	places	does	not	always	need	to	be	justified	based	on	economic	performance.	There	are
important	public	good	arguments	that	could	justify	increased	expenditure	across	a	wide	range	of	policy	areas.	For
example,	it	is	possible	to	argue	for	subsidising	rural	broadband	as	a	public	good	while	recognising	that	its	economic
impacts	are	likely	to	be	limited.
Distributional	arguments	can	also	be	used	to	support	intervention.	For	example,	reversing	austerity	cuts	to	welfare
benefits	would	disproportionately	benefit	areas	with	high	concentrations	of	disadvantaged	households.	But	it	is
important	to	be	realistic	about	the	likely	economic	impact	of	these	policies	so	that	we	properly	consider	sustainable
sources	of	government	revenue	to	fund	this	increased	public	expenditure.
Conclusion
Spatial	disparities	in	the	UK	are	profound	and	persistent.	Improving	economic	performance	and	helping	to	tackle
the	problems	of	left-behind	places	are	both	important	policy	objectives.	Addressing	these	challenges	requires	a	new
approach	to	policy,	one	that	allows	for	different	responses	in	different	places.	Such	variation	makes	many	people
nervous.	But	it	is	important	to	remember	that	we	should	care	more	about	the	effect	of	policies	on	people	than	on
places.	Policies	should	be	judged	on	the	extent	to	which	they	improve	individual	opportunities	and	on	who	benefits,
rather	than	whether	they	narrow	the	gap	between	particular	places.
This	post	represents	the	views	of	the	author	and	not	those	of	the	Brexit	blog,	nor	the	LSE.	It	is	an	edited	extract
from	a	Centre	for	Economic	Performance	(CEP)	briefing.
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